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Adults are capable of performing arithmetical opera-
tions. They have gone through many years of formal school-
ing and learnt mathematical rules and concepts. The chil-
dren, even before they start first grade, have mastered the 
basics: preschoolers know how to count and they know to 
do simple arithmetic operation such as addition and subtrac-
tion. In the last couple of decades researchers have tried to 
prove that the number domain develops before other cog-
nitive capacities. A growing body of research shows that 
infants are granted with numerical abilities (Wynn 1998; 
Xu & Spelke, 2000; McCrink & Wynn, 2007). This paper 
is going to present that research. Studies that have found 
infants possess numerical abilities, such as enumeration 
or performing operations (addition and subtraction) on the 
enumerated numerosities will be considered. These studies 
will be critically examined. Also, models that account for 
infants’ early numerical abilities will be reviewed. 
Are infants capable of enumeration?
The term numerosity is used in the literature to refer to 
a number of entities in a set, and enumeration is the process 
by which nonverbal animals and preverbal infants manage 
to determine the numerosity of a set (enumeration could be 
considered as a precursor of verbal counting). Infants are 
not capable of verbal counting, but they are very proficient 
in the domain of enumeration. Many researchers have re-
ported that infants can discriminate numerosities (Starkey & 
Cooper, 1980; Wynn, 1996; Xu & Spelke, 2000). They are 
also capable of abstracting numerosities across modalities 
(Kobayashi, Hiraki, Mugitani & Hasegawa, 2004). Most of 
the studies are done with infants a couple of months old. The 
stimuli are varied through different modalities from study to 
study, ranging from dots on a screen, to a sequence of drum 
beats or jumps of a toy (Starkey, Spelke, & Gelman, 1990; 
Wynn, 1996; Xu & Spelke, 2000).
Starkey and Cooper (1980) showed that infants could 
discriminate small numerosities. They used the habituation-
dishabituation paradigm. In this paradigm, a stimulus, for 
example, 2 dots on a screen, is shown a number of times. 
The dots vary in size and position. Infants at first spend 
some time looking at it, but after a while they habituate (get 
used to the stimulus) and decrease the looking time. After 
the habituation criteria have been satisfied, a test is intro-
duced. Infants are shown a novel stimulus, for example 3 
dots, and a familiar stimulus used during the habituation 
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The early studies of infants’ numerical abilities have shown that infants could discriminate numerosities and 
even form expectation about the outcome of a mathematical operation. In these studies, however, the number was 
confounded with continuous variables that co-vary with number, therefore subjecting this early research to a criti-
cism. So, it was not clear whether infants possess genuine numerical abilities or not. In recent studies a control for 
continuous variables was introduced and it has been found that infants discriminate large numerosities, but not small 
ones. When small numerosities are confounded with other variables, infants discriminate them easily. It appears that 
infants represent small and large numerosities differently. Two systems of number have been proposed to account 
for the findings. One of the systems is responsible for approximate representation of large numerical magnitudes 
and the other for precise representation of small ones. Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain how 
these systems work. The systems are found across animals as well and could provide a foundation upon which more 
sophisticated, specifically human, mathematical abilities are built.
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phase. It is assumed that infants will look longer at the novel 
stimulus, which would imply they recognize that they are 
different. In this paradigm infants rely on their enumeration 
abilities to decide whether there is a difference between the 
two stimuli.
In their study infants were found to discriminate small 
numerosities (1, 2 and 3) but not large ones (4 and 6). The 
mechanism underlying this ability was called subitizing (a 
very fast and accurate perception of small numerosities). 
The larger numbers were thought to lie outside of the subi-
tizing range and therefore infants could not discriminate 
those two numerosities. The next step was taken by Starkey, 
Spelke and Gelman (1990) who also used the habituation-
dishabituation paradigm. Instead of dots, they used more 
complex stimuli, such as photographs of different objects 
taken from a various distance. Again, they found that infants 
could discriminate numerosities. They took their research 
further by examining cross modal matching of numerosities 
using the preferential looking paradigm. In this paradigm 
infants are presented with a picture of two or three objects 
while playing two or three drum beats and their looking 
time is measured. When two drum beats were presented 
they tended to look more at the picture with two objects 
and when three drum beats were presented they tended to 
look at the picture of three objects. It appears that infants 
are able to detect numerical correspondence, but it may not 
be necessarily so. When the drum beats and the photographs 
are presented simultaneously infants could just match one 
drum beat with one object on one to one correspondence 
basis. In that case, they would not need to use enumera-
tion abilities. However, if the drum beats are not presented 
simultaneously with the photographs, then infants’ perform-
ance must rely on their enumeration abilities (Starkey et al., 
1990). Indeed, what Starkey et al. (1990) found is that in-
fants could match the numerical magnitude of  two sets even 
when they were not simultaneously present (by first present-
ing photographs of either 2 or 3 objects, and then playing 2 
and 3 drum beats while measuring the infants looking time 
at the sound source). For example, infants looked longer at 
the sound source from which 2 drum beats were coming 
when they first saw picture with two objects. This means 
that the infants were not only able to enumerate visually 
presented stimuli and enumerate audible stimuli, but they 
were also able to detect cross modal numerical correspond-
ence between object and sounds. These results contribute 
to the growing body of evidence that infants are able to ab-
stract numerosity. 
Another evidence that infants abstract numerosity comes 
from Wynn (1996). Using the habituation-dishabituation 
paradigm she presented infants with rather unusual stimuli: 
a physical action (jumps of a toy). She had two groups of 
infants. One of the groups was habituated to 2 jumps and 
the other to 3 jumps. For example, the habituation began 
with a curtain raising up and revealing a puppet. The pup-
pet made 2 jumps, pausing briefly between jumps, and than 
stood still. At the end of a trial the curtain dropped for a 
short period of time and obscured the puppet, and imme-
diately afterwards rose again to mark the beginning of the 
next trial. After the habituation criteria were satisfied the in-
fants received six trials in which the puppet jumped 2 and 
3 times alternately. As in the other studies, those who were 
habituated to 2 jumps dishabituated to 3 jumps and those 
who were habituated to 3 jumps dishabituated to 2 jumps. 
It appears that infants are able to regard numerosity as an 
abstract feature of a set of entities.
Another kind of evidence goes in favor of the idea that 
infants are able to abstract numerosity. It is not only indi-
vidual entities that infants discriminate, but also a collec-
tion of entities. In a study conducted by Wynn, Bloom and 
Chiang (2002) it was found that infants could discriminate, 
for example, 4 groups of 2 objects and 2 groups of 4 ob-
jects. This means that the numerosity discrimination is not 
dependent on objects, but the characteristic of a number as 
a property of a collection of entities is abstracted, regardless 
of whether the entities are individual objects, collection of 
objects, or physical actions (Wynn, 1996).
In most of the studies mentioned so far, researchers have 
used only small numerosities. Starkey and Cooper (1980), 
however, used large numbers (4 and 6) and found that in-
fants could not discriminate large numerosity, but in their 
study the numerical distance between the two large numbers 
was very small. That is why other researchers decided to test 
infants with large numbers with large numerical distance. 
Xu and Spelke (2000) presented infants with two condi-
tions. In the first condition, 6 month old infants managed 
to discriminate 8 from 16 dots (1:2 ratio), but failed to dis-
criminate 8 from 12 dots. It seemed as infants are able to 
discriminate large numerosities, provided the numerical dis-
tance between them is sufficient, that is, infants discriminate 
approximately. Others (Xu & Arriaga, 2007) have tested 10 
month old infants with the 8 vs 12 (2:3 ratio) condition and 
found that these older infants were able to discriminate 8 
from 12, but not 8 from 10 (4:5 ratio). Adults can discrimi-
nate ratios of 1:1.15 (Van Oeffelen & Vos, 1982, as cited in 
Lipton & Spelke, 2003). It appears that the ability to dis-
criminate becomes better with age.
These infants’ abilities are not characteristic of the hu-
mans only. They represent an evolutionary heritage because 
they are also found in the animal world. Animals have been 
found to discriminate approximately between numerosities 
(see Gallistel & Gelman, 1992, 2000; Dehaene, 1997 for a 
review) and the data gathered is similar to the data obtained 
with infants and humans.
Do infants possess abilities that go beyond  
enumeration?
Infants are not only capable of enumeration abilities, 
but they also have ordinal numerical knowledge. Infants of 
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11 months have been found to possess ordinal numerical 
knowledge, whereas 9 month old infants did not possess 
ordinal numerical knowledge, but had ordinal non-numeri-
cal knowledge (i.e. were able to discriminate the ordinal di-
rection of sequence that varied in size, but not in number; 
Brannon, 2002). These findings suggest that the numerical 
ordinal competence is separate from the non numerical or-
dinal competence, and that the later develops first. It is also 
apparent that early primitive system exists not only for rep-
resenting numerosities but for comparing them as well.
This simple enumeration and comparison process is not 
where infants’ abilities terminate. Apparently, once infants 
have enumerated the entities they can also perform trans-
formation operations. In a classical study, Wynn (1992) 
showed that infants can form expectation about the outcome 
of a mathematical operation, using the violation of expecta-
tion paradigm. In this paradigm infants are shown an object. 
Then, an obstacle is introduced in front of the object which 
hides the object from view. The infant could see the obstacle, 
but not what is behind it. Next, another object is put behind 
the obstacle while the infant watches. In half of the trials, 
one of the objects is secretly removed, without the infants 
being aware of it. In the other half, the original object and the 
added object remain. After the obstacle is removed, infants 
are faced with either possible (1+1=2 objects) or impossible 
(1+1=1 object) outcome. If infants have formed some ex-
pectation about the outcome (1+1=2), then they should be 
surprised when they see the impossible outcome (1+1=1) 
and thus spend longer time looking at that outcome than at 
the possible one. In another version of this paradigm, a sub-
traction operation can be substituted for addition operation. 
In the subtraction condition, more than one object is shown 
initially. Afterwards, one or more are removed and again 
infants are shown possible or impossible outcome. Wynn 
(1992) used this paradigm and reported that infants looked 
significantly longer at the impossible outcome, which would 
imply that infants have formed an expectation about the out-
come of the mathematical operation. In this paradigm infants 
used their enumeration abilities, but they also manipulated 
the enumerated numerosities. In the study Wynn used small 
numbers (1, 2 and 3) and the infants formed exact expecta-
tions about the outcome. Earlier it was shown that infants 
represent numerical magnitudes approximately. It would be 
important to see whether these approximate representations 
extend to arithmetical operations as well, because if that is 
so, it would indicate a common mechanism in which both 
operations (enumeration and transformation such as addi-
tion or subtraction) work. For example, one can investigate 
whether infants would form expectations if larger numbers 
are used, and whether these expectations would exist for ex-
act or approximate operations (for example 6+10=14 to be 
regarded as true and 6+7=8 as false).  Indeed, a recent study 
has looked at this ability. McCrink and Wynn (2004), how-
ever, used exact large numbers (5+5=10 or 5 and 10-5=5 or 
10). They found that infants looked longer at the unexpected 
outcome and concluded that infants possess procedures for 
numerical computations. Studies with approximate arith-
metic have also been done, however not with infants. Such 
studies have been conducted with preschoolers and it has 
been shown that they are capable of approximate arithmetic 
(Barth, La Mont, Lipton, Dehaene, Kanwisher, & Spelke, 
2006; Gilmore & Spelke, 2008). Future studies will need to 
trace this ability back to infancy. If infants are found capable 
of approximate computation it would support a primitive 
computational system which serves as a basis for develop-
ment of a more sophisticated exact computational system, a 
feature of humans only. 
A recent study has shown that infants are capable of 
extracting ratios. McCrink and Wynn (2007) presented in-
fants with different examples of the same ratio during the 
habituation phase. The stimuli were yellow Pac-Men and 
blue pellets that were presented in a single ratio during the 
habituation phase. In the test phase they presented either 
different example of the same ratio or different ratio. The 
infants looked significantly longer at the novel ratio, sug-
gesting that they abstracted the ratio.
It appears that infants can not only enumerate sets, but 
also know that 1 is followed by 2 and 2 by 3. They can also 
“say” whether the outcome of an arithmetical operation (ad-
dition and subtraction only) is correct or not (by shorter and 
longer looking time, accordingly). Also, when presented 
with different examples of the same ratio, infants are able 
to extract the ratio. It almost appears as if infants are more 
prepared for mathematics than first graders are! This idea 
has encouraged many researchers to seek for alternative ex-
planations for the infant’s performance.
Infants’ abilities – a fatal flaw in design?
Not all researchers agree that infants have numerical 
abilities. Mix, Huttenlocher and Levine (2002) reviewed 
the available literature regarding infants’ enumeration abili-
ties. They concluded that the researchers who reported that 
infants can discriminate numbers did not control for all the 
continuous variables that co-vary with number. For exam-
ple, in their classical study Starkey and Cooper (1980) did 
not control for continuous variables such as contour length 
or total surface area. In that study, the stimuli used in both 
conditions (dots) were of the same size. This means that in 
the 3 dots condition infants did not only see more in terms 
of a number, but also in terms of total area (3 black dots 
on a white background fills up more space than 2 black 
dots on a white area). Because a greater number also meant 
greater surface area and greater contour length (circumfer-
ence), in their study infants could have reacted to these other 
continuous variables that co-vary with number, and not to 
number. In other studies, where other type of stimuli was 
used, infants could react to other continuous variables. In 
the studies where sound stimuli were used, infants could use 
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non numeric cues such as tempo or duration. Same holds 
true for the jumps study: the total duration of the jumps 
was longer when there were three jumps than when there 
were two, therefore infants could react to duration and not 
to number. Mix et al. (2002) propose that infants react to 
difference in sets but they are guided by many cues, which 
under normal circumstances co-vary with one another. It is 
these combined cues that infants react to. This possibility 
re-opens the questions of whether infants possess genuine 
ability to abstract numerosities.
The studies using the violation of expectation paradigm 
have also been criticized. Feigenson, Carey and Spelke 
(2002) conducted a replication of Wynn (1992) experiment. 
In their study they controlled for volume, contour length 
and density and found that infants were reacting to novel 
continuous variables and not a number. In the pre-test phase 
they presented one large toy and in the post-test phase they 
presented either two smaller toys with the same surface area 
as the first (large) toy, or one smaller toy (same number, dif-
ferent area). According to Wynn (1992), the infants would 
look longer at the two smaller toys, but Feigenson’s (Fei-
genson et al., 2002) findings show that infants looked longer 
at the toy with a different surface area but the same numer-
osity. Their results imply that infants reacted to other con-
tinuous variables, and not a number, that is they added other 
continuous variables and expected to see more of these, and 
not number.
Two more arguments could be given against the conclu-
sion that infants are capable of enumeration and transfor-
mation of numerosities. The first one comes from another 
interpretation of the Wynn (1992) study. This interpretation 
is called the object file model and will be discussed in a later 
section. Briefly, it holds that infants just made same/different 
judgment without any reference to a number. Third interpre-
tation is that infants just look longer at the more familiar and 
more complex stimuli (Cohen & Marks, 2002).
Finally, one should be very cautious when prescribing 
greater numerical abilities to infants than to children attend-
ing first grade. First of all, in all studies the main indica-
tor for whatever is being measured is the looking time. But 
we know very little of what are the rules that guide infants’ 
watching (Mix, 2002). When making claims such that in-
fants are capable of arithmetical operations, we need much 
firmer proof than just measuring their looking time. For ex-
ample, in the cross modal matching studies, it was taken 
that infants determine equivalence of the numerical mag-
nitude of the sets because they looked longer at the sound 
source which emitted the same number of drum beats as the 
number of objects shown in a photograph. But if the goal of 
the research was to prove that infants discriminate 2 drum 
beats from 3 dots, how can we interpret the results? Do in-
fants do not discriminate numerosities presented in different 
modalities or they do, but prefer to match (and look longer 
at the same numerosities) rather than to discriminate them 
(and look longer at different numerosity)?
Nevertheless, although most of the research regarding 
infants’ numerical abilities has been subjected to a severe 
criticism, it is obvious from different paradigms that infants 
do possess genuine numerical abilities, though in rudimen-
tary form.
 In the next section studies that controlled for continu-
ous variables will be presented. These studies showed that 
infants do discriminate numerosities and are able to perform 
arithmetical operations, therefore ruling out all other expla-
nations of infant’s performance in these tasks.
In defense of infants’ numerical abilities
Several arguments can be given against the claim that in-
fants do not discriminate numerosities. Brannon and Cordes 
(2008) habituated infants to constant cumulative area while 
varying the numerosity (set size of one, two, or three ele-
ments) and tested the infants with a threefold and fourfold 
change in cumulative area and found that infants could not 
discriminate threefold change in area, but did discriminate 
fourfold changes. They repeated the experiments with larger 
numbers and found the same results. In contrast, infants eas-
ily discriminate twofold changes in a number when habitu-
ated to stimuli with constant number but varying area from 
slide to slide (Brannon, Abbott, & Lutz, 2004). Therefore, it 
would seem that infants discriminate changes in a number 
much more easily than they notice changes in cumulative 
area, which means that they discriminate a number and not 
continuous variables.
Another argument against the findings that infants have 
no numerical abilities comes from Hurewitz, Gelman and 
Schnitzel (2006) who have found that in adults the perform-
ance on tasks that require discrete numerical comparisons 
are affected by variation of stimuli along a continuous quan-
tity (size). They argue that children may find it difficult to 
disregard the irrelevant dimension in experiments that sys-
tematically vary size, contour area or number. Therefore, 
they think that the studies which demonstrated that children 
prefer area over number do not reflect a lack of numerical 
competence but limits in inhibitory processing where in-
fants are unable to disregard the area.
Xu (2003) conducted two experiments in which she 
studied infants’ numerical discrimination while controlling 
for total area and contour length. In the first experiment she 
showed that infants could discriminate two large numerosi-
ties (4 and 8), but in the second she failed to show that in-
fants discriminate small numerosities (2 and 4). This study 
is important because the same procedure and the same kind 
of stimuli were used in the two experiments and the same 
variables were controlled, therefore providing the first direct 
comparison between the ability to discriminate large and 
small numerosities. In this study only large numerosities 
(with sufficient numerical distance) could be discriminat-
ed when controlled for other continuous variables, but not 
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small numerosities. Other studies (Starkey & Cooper, 1980; 
Starkey, Spelke & Gelman, 1990) have shown that when 
continuous variables are confounded with (small) numbers 
infants can discriminate. The results point to the idea that 
two systems for numerical representation are present in in-
fancy.
A finding by Brannon, Lutz and Cordes (2006) supports 
the idea of a common representational system for a number 
and continuous variables. In their study, 6 month old in-
fants detected 1:2 ratio change in area of a single object (not 
cumulative area, which would require adding the areas of 
more than one object), but not 2:3 ratio change. This is inter-
esting because infants at that age are able to detect twofold 
change in number and duration, suggesting that the three 
variables belong to a common representational system un-
derlying number, area and time discrimination (Brannon et 
al., 2006)
In order to account for the available data that infants and 
adults can discriminate small numerosities when confound-
ed with other continuous variables, but only approximately 
discriminate large numerosities it has been suggested that 
two core systems of numbers exist (Feigenson, Dehaene, & 
Spelke, 2004). One system is responsible for “keeping track 
of small number of individual objects and for representing 
information about their continuous quantitative properties” 
(Feigenson et al., 2004 p. 310). The other system is the 
system for approximate representation of numerical mag-
nitudes, often referred to as number sense. The systems are 
thought to be common across animals, infants and adults. 
The approximate representation of a numerical magnitude 
is accompanied by the so-called distance and magnitude 
(or size) effect. The distance effect refers to the fact that 
discrimination between two numerosities becomes harder 
as the numerical separation between the two numerosities 
decreases (it is harder to discriminate 5 from 6 than 5 from 
10). The size effect refers to the fact that for equal numerical 
distances discrimination decreases as the numbers become 
larger (it is harder to discriminate 9 from 10 than 2 from 3) 
(Dehaene, 1997).
Regarding infants abilities for performing operations 
on the numerosities, it was earlier stated that the object file 
model is an equally plausible explanation for their perform-
ance as the assumption of numerical abilities. However, the 
object file model has limitation in the number of items it 
can keep open which is about three (see the next section). 
Therefore, if larger numbers are used and infants still per-
form equally well, the object file can not be the correct ex-
planation for their abilities to perform computations. Mc-
Crink and Wynn (2004) used larger numbers (5+5=5 or 10) 
and found that infants did look longer at the unexpected 
outcome (5+5=5), providing more convincing evidence that 
infants possess numerical competence.
Most of the studies suggest that we are born with an in-
nate capacity (or capacity that develops very early in the on-
togeny) to understand numerosities. The two core systems 
of number provide the basic meaning of a number and are 
a necessary precondition for learning the associations be-
tween the perceived numerosity and the symbol represent-
ing it, such as a numerical word or Arabic digits (von Aster 
& Shalev, 2007). Young children’s verbal counting builds 
on infants’ enumeration abilities. As infants become tod-
dlers and then preschoolers they acquire the exact mean-
ing of each number word. At first they know that number 
words refer to numbers but do not know to which number 
they refer. It takes about one year since they have mastered 
the meaning of the word “one” until they learn the meaning 
of all number words within their counting range. Perhaps 
this slow learning process is a result of the approximate rep-
resentation of number where close numerosities are often 
confused with one another. As young children grow older 
these two systems probably merge and humans are capable 
of representing exact large numerosities.
Next, three theoretical models of early enumeration are 
going to be considered. Each of these models explains how 
one or the other core system works.
Theoretical models of early enumeration 
Several models have been proposed to account for in-
fants’ enumeration abilities. Here, three of them will be pre-
sented: the accumulator model, the neuronal network model 
and the object file model. The first two assume an analog 
representation of a number and they explain the approxi-
mate representation of a number. The object file model from 
the analog representation models differs in the nature it 
represents numerosity. Unlike the other two models, it does 
not represent number, but represents objects. This model ac-
counts for the precise representation of small numerosities.
The accumulator model operates by emission of pulses 
at a constant rate. The model was first proposed by Meck 
and Church (1983) to account for rats’ numerical compe-
tence. Later it was applied to infants’ preverbal numerical 
competence. The model works as follows: to begin counting 
a switch is turned off to channel the impulses in the accu-
mulator for a brief period. The switch is opened and closed 
for each entity to be counted. Since the impulses are emitted 
at a constant rate the amount of impulses that enter the ac-
cumulator for each item is equivalent. The numerosity of the 
items counted is represented by the fullness of the accumu-
lator which consists of all the increments. After the counting 
has finished the total amount in the accumulator is propor-
tional to the number of entities counted. This means that the 
relationships between the numerical quantities are exactly 
reproduced by the representations of the numerical quan-
tities (Wynn, 1998). For example, five is three more than 
two, and the representation (the fullness of the accumula-
tor) for five is three more increments than the representation 
for two. However, due to an inherent error in the enumera-
tion process, such as the variability of the amount of time 
the switch stays closed or the rate at which the impulses 
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are emitted, the fullness of the accumulator after counting 
a given numerosity will vary from count to count and this 
variability will be normally distributed around a mean full-
ness. As the numerosity increases so will the variance of 
the distribution (Wynn 1998). That means that the numer-
osities are represented approximately. This explains why 
infants can reliably discriminate some ratios but not others. 
For example, 6-months-old infants cannot discriminate 8 
from 12 (2:3 ratios) (Xu & Spelke, 2000). Presumably, their 
representations of these two numerosities are too noisy and 
cannot be discriminated from one another. A useful analogy 
when thinking about this is the level of water in a measuring 
cup. If the measuring cup is still, the water level can be read 
against the markings of the cup (let us say 150 ml). But if 
the cup is shaken the water level will fluctuate between 100 
and 200 ml, that is, the representation is too noisy. Similarly 
happens with the representations of the numbers, yet, the 
larger the number the greater the fluctuation.
 According to the accumulator model, addition could be 
achieved by pouring the content of two accumulators into a 
third empty one. Similarly, subtraction could be achieved by 
removing the content from one accumulator (Vilette, 2002). 
This explains how infants can form expectations about the 
outcome of an arithmetic operation.
The neuronal network model was proposed by Dehaene 
& Changeux (1993). If the accumulator model was mecha-
nistic, the neuronal network model is biologically based. Its 
main component is the numerosity detection system which 
consists of a retina, a map of object locations and numerosity 
detectors. Objects of differing sizes and locations are repre-
sented on the retina. Because these objects (the input) differ 
in size, shape and other features, the input is normalized in 
order for each entity to be counted as one object regard-
less of size, shape etc. This normalization is accomplished 
by allocating approximately constant number of neurons to 
each object on a map of object location. Once normalization 
has taken place the total neuronal activity in the normalized 
location map is estimated. That estimate corresponds to the 
fullness of the accumulator in the accumulator model. The 
summation of the total neuronal activity is done by numer-
osity detectors in the parietal lobe. Each detector reacts to 
certain total activity it receives which falls within a range 
that varies from detector to detector. That means that some 
numerosity detectors are tuned to few specific numbers and 
will react only to them. Therefore each neuronal detector 
will react to a certain approximate number of objects (De-
haene, 1997). For example a neuron may react optimally to 
the number 8, less optimally to 7, 6, 9 and 10 and even less 
optimally to 5, 4, 11 and 12. Because some numerosities 
cause firing of the same neurons (although less optimally) 
they are indistinguishable from each other, hence infants 
cannot discriminate them.
The object file model suggests that infants demonstrate 
success in number tasks via nonnumeric methods. In order 
to represent the items that need to be enumerated infants 
use mental tokens. This model holds that the properties of 
each perceived object such as color, size and location are 
encoded in a separate file. Each time a new object appears a 
new object-file is opened (Vilette, 2002). Two objects would 
be encoded by the representation of the form “Yi Yj” be-
cause there is no single symbol for two. The infants have 
no arithmetic procedures in their mind, but only the abil-
ity to manipulate mental representations of objects. For ex-
ample, in Wynn’s (1992) experiment, infants activated one 
token or object-file for the first object they saw. After the 
screen was raised and another object was added the infants 
activated another object-file and had two object-files open. 
When the screen was lowered infants were faced with one 
object and created object file representation for the unex-
pected outcome (activated one object-file). They compared 
the initial state with the present state on a one-to-one cor-
respondence basis and noticed discrepancies (Feigenson et 
al., 2002). The object-file model is limited in the number 
of object-files that it can keep open, which is about 3 for 
children and 4 for adults. This explains why numbers up to 3 
can be represented exactly, but afterwards the representation 
becomes fuzzier. 
In this section three models that explain infants’ enumer-
ation abilities were considered. Some models describe the 
functioning of the first core system, and some the function-
ing of the second core system of numbers. One of the mod-
els is referred to as non-verbal counting because it works in 
a similar way to counting: moving one number up by adding 
one increment. This might suggest that children possess in-
tuitive counting knowledge and that they know the underly-
ing concept of counting before they learn how to count 
Conclusion
In this paper it was taken a view that infants possess 
genuine numerical abilities. In the last couple of decades 
researchers have provided convincing evidence that infants 
are capable of enumeration. Infants have been found to dis-
criminate small numerosities exactly, when other co-vary-
ing variables are not controlled for and large numerosities 
approximately when other co-varying variables are control-
led for. Because infants represent small and large numer-
osities differently, two systems for number have been pro-
posed. The two systems share evolutionary heritage with the 
animal species. 
Infants are also capable of performing arithmetical op-
erations, such as addition and subtraction. Alternative ex-
planations for their performance have been ruled out by a 
study which controls for continuous variables and which 
makes the object file explanation unlikely. Other studies 
have found infants to possess ordinal numerical knowledge 
and showed that they can abstract a ratio when shown a dif-
ferent example of the same ratio.
Some of the studies with infants have been subjected to 
a criticism because of a flaw in the experimental design. The 
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early studies did not control for continuous variables but the 
more recent ones did, and they show that infants do pos-
sess genuine numerical abilities. Perhaps, the biggest criti-
cism comes from the chosen indicators: the looking time. 
It is argued that the rules by which infants look at, are still 
unknown. However, the fact remains that, when the same 
procedure is used, infants could discriminate large numbers 
but not small ones. Furthermore, the evidence from the ha-
bituation-dishabituation paradigm, preferential looking par-
adigm, and the violation of expectation paradigm, all point 
to the fact that infants possess numerical abilities.
Three models that account for infants’ performance 
were presented. The object file model does not presume nu-
merical abilities and it explains infants’ performance on the 
same-different basis. When infants are tested in a habitua-
tion-dishabituation paradigm with small numbers it is likely 
that they utilize this mechanism. On the other hand, when 
they need to discriminate large numbers their performance 
is based on the accumulator model or the neuronal network 
model, which make very similar predictions.
Although most authors would agree that infants possess 
numerical abilities, they are far from the numerical abilities 
found in adults. Infant’s early and rather primitive abilities 
are found in the animal kingdom as well, and they serve as a 
foundation on which all specifically human numerical abili-
ties are later built.
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